Showing posts with label affect. Show all posts
Showing posts with label affect. Show all posts

Monday, August 22, 2011

Revisiting Philifesophy with a Smile

It's been four months since I sat for my comps and defended my exam, which means that it's been four months since I last read a book and since I last committed myself to the daily grind of doing academic philosophy. Remember when I decided to give myself "a week or two off" and not worry about work but rather really allow myself to enjoy a break and drive across the country with my best friend? Well, the break that was supposed to only be a couple of weeks grew into a month. I thought that when I started summer teaching I would be forced back into a routine that would be more conducive for writing and research. Turns out it was, but in a different way. I wrote more on my blog. And I learned a whole lot more than I would have anticipated from teaching. I did not, however, return to my old routines of doing philosophy.

Instead, in May I found myself at the beginning of new relationship. Although unexpected, as the weeks passed I continued to allow myself to be and feel more like myself than ever before with this one person. Without a doubt, this has definitely been one of the greatest things that I could have done for myself over this summer. In terms of my happiness, my goals, and my hopes for my future, it may have been one of the most important things I could have done as well, for I have learned more about the things I think and write about all of the time--such as experience, affect, trust, vulnerability, identity, relationality--by simply being with and in them than I really thought possible for me right now. And it's been easy. Super easy.

And very, very fun.

So with respect to the other key elements of my philifesophy, I have been experiencing things that are very important for my life and my research. In my dissertation I want to talk about positive affective experiences that can make us healthier, happier, stronger, more vibrant beings, and fortunately, when I think of the past four months of this summer and this new relationship, such words are constantly apt descriptors along with:  exuberance, gaiety, cheerfulness, laughter, pleasure, and play. All the same words that are central to my philosophy have been thematic of my personal and interpersonal experiences this summer, and perhaps in this way, even though I wasn't doing much reading or academic writing, this connects back to one crucial part of doing philosophy that I identified back in May--that there are many ways that we can and should take care of ourselves, and that life is necessary for philosophy. If philosophy is the art of life, then it should come as no surprise that to do philosophy well, we ought to be living well, too. One affects the other, and it goes both ways.

It's a little strange to think of this past summer as a gift to myself, but in a way, it was. I allowed myself to not do the work that I had fully intended on doing, and I surprised myself by directing my attention to other important parts of me that have been wanting to be cultivated for a really long time now. Parts of me that I have been tending to already, but that didn't yet have their opportunity to grow. When some rich, fertile soil presents itself though, it's very hard to not seize the day and attempt to put down some roots. Such an act can be scary at times, and there are risks involved (echoes of Nietzsche ring out to me!). And sometimes timing is everything. This time, it worked out. I had long open summer days filled with friendship, dancing, adventures, cooking, traveling, movie watching, and talking. And feeling at home with another person. I don't know when another opportunity to be so free and open with my time and with myself will present itself. I am so glad that it did. And I am very grateful that I took put myself into it.

So another month went by, and then another month. My summer class ended. And now, the fall semester has begun. I had my first class today, and I have been kind of hoping all along that the routine and rhythm of the fall semester will pick me up and put me back into the swing of things so that I can actually get some "real" work done. Just like I had hoped from my summer teaching schedule. But I am a bit worried that maybe it won't. Maybe I'll stay really relaxed, really grounded, really healthy. Maybe this relationship will continue and I'll continue to feel balanced, playful, and prioritize my time in ways that I wouldn't have ever anticipated two or three years ago. Isn't it weird that my "maybes" seem to indicate that these feelings and graduate work are mutually exclusive?

And/or/but maybe this will be the best thing for my writing. Maybe I'll be writing from a place of health, exuberance, and joy, and that will positively affect the work that I do. (That's what I've been suggesting for quite some time now, so I hope that it is the case...for a handful of reasons.) So, after a good, healthy, wonderful, and replenishing four months of summer, I am trying to prepare myself for a fourth year of graduate school. I feel healthy, excited, calm, and confident. And I am happy. I am smiling.



I hope that things (can and do) continue like this.






Thursday, August 4, 2011

You've Gotta Give 'Em Hope

As indicated by my more recent posts, teaching has been on my mind. It's in large part thanks to the students in my summer course that I have realized one more thing:

You've gotta give 'em hope.

In this class we've spent six weeks talking about really heavy stuff like disciplinary norms of compulsory heterosexuality, gender policing, insecurities of masculinity, and the the interplays of racism and other forms of domination and oppression. Although it's called "Philosophy of Love and Sex," I've made it about how attitudes, assumptions, beliefs, pleasures, choices, desires, and some of the most basic parts of our experience that are usually taken for granted work within a historical, social, and very political framework that privileges some and restricts the freedom of others. Sure talking about sex for 75 minutes every day sounds like a lot of fun for most 18-21 year olds, which is why I think most people initially sign up for the class, but after weeks like this past one where the focus of our attention shifts to the brutality of transphobic violence, it becomes pretty clear that even though we often have a lot of laughs and a good amount of fun, we are always talking about serious stuff. Matters of life and death. Pretty soon, once one begins to traverse the path of a philosophical undertaking, where historical narratives about how and why things are the way that they are become increasingly complicated and interwoven, the structures of normalization and oppression can quickly become overwhelming.

For it's not enough to simply critically explore the nature of heterosexuality, but also all of the other kinds of sexualities that people have like bisexuality, homosexuality, pan- and asexuality. And then we add issues of race, culture, gender, ability and disability, intersexuality, transgender embodiments, class, and how these factors shift the meaning and experience of sexual identities in ever more complex ways. At the same time, notions of science as a normalizing discourse, religion, and history are cast under the skeptical light, while what counts as natural bodies, reality, and even truth itself are also revealed to be elements of a much larger network of institutions and discourses that serve particular, and political, ends. And yes, even standard appeals to evolution are no longer accepted at face value.

This is a review of six weeks worth of material for my summer course


For some people, all of this critical thinking is just too exhausting. Thinking and talking about these issues takes work, dedication, and if one really tries to untangle the issues, there's a risk of throwing everything into question. Even what you think and believe and know about yourself. Or perhaps especially what you think and believe and thought you knew about yourself. Yes, sometimes people would just rather not know because it's "easier."  And sometimes some people describe these issues as being "real downers," and they criticize those who do dedicate their time and energy to bringing these issues to light as being too sensitive, too dramatic, or overly politically-correct. If nothing else, people who focus on such "downer issues," like forms of oppression, might be accused of being bitter, resentful, miserable people who have to blame others for their own struggles. Such attitudes reflect a general dismissal of the issues and what's at stake concerning people's lives (but more accurately, it's probably the lives of others). It also can reflect an attitude of apathy.

These responses came up this week in Jose Medina's public talk as part of PIKSI (Philosophy in a Key Summer Institute) at Penn State (Here's a link to the website). In his paper, "Invisible Identities, Social Blindness, and Irresponsible Ignorance" Medina noted that addressing social ignorance about particular communities (such as the Jewish Community at Vanderbilt) requires addressing cognitive gaps--what people really don't know--as well as the affective lacks, such as when people learn about something but then respond with apathy and don't care about the issues at hand. This notion of apathy became a topic of discussion in the following Q&A session, and the challenge seemed to be this: How do you get those who have the privilege of not needing to know or care about the practices and experiences of other groups to actually own up to some degree of epistemic responsibility and begin to care about how their own identities stand in relation to those of others? When we are talking about people in privileged positions, whose privileged status may actually be better served by not knowing these relationships which often involve the domination and oppression of marginalized groups, apathy becomes a real problem.

While apathetic responses are certainly problematic, I don't think that the challenge of motivating social change and increased political sensitivity ends there. Even after apathy, there's the sheer size of the struggles and complicated relationships between related forms of oppression that are, as if by their very nature as oppressive systems, institutions, and discourses, disempowering.

Fortunately, in my experience of teaching, and in this summer class in particular, many of my students have managed to identify and appreciate the individual pieces of this puzzle we have discussed over the past few weeks. By the questions they ask and the insights they offer, I can also tell that many of them are able to see how the pieces fit together to make a bigger picture, an interrelated mosaic of seemingly disparate issues. And the better news is that many of them really seem to care. Few, if any, are overtly apathetic.

But as we approach the end of the summer session, I have been picking up the distinct sense that something else is creeping into the room. Not so much apathy, but rather something more like hopelessness and despair. But it's not just because they see how so many violent, dehumanizing acts affect the lives of real people, but rather because they do understand even more that these issues are not going to be easily resolved.  After unpacking and undermining some of our most basic assumptions, they are starting to realize the magnitude of what they did not know before (and by implication how much they still do not know), that the world and politics and history and how they have always gone about living their lives might be part of a historical narrative that they actually don't want to be a part of anymore.

The problem is that now, they don't know what to do about it. Or they may think that there is nothing that they can do about it.

So, at this point in the semester, it's not uncommon for students to write a sophisticated re-telling of the current state of affairs, again, evidencing a deeply developed critical perspective, only to follow this up by stating, "But change is unlikely because it would take so much to make any difference at the level of society and culture as a whole."  And class discussions are at risk of dissolving into empty repetitions of all the right words, "It's because of heteronormative patriarchal society's values and our dependence on binary oppositions that people feel threatened by the identities of others because they reveal the instability of faithfully assumed "truths" about sex and gender." (Lest one fear that I am only creating queer little feminist monsters in my classes, the vacuity of statements like this concerns me almost as much as when students say that transwomen are really just men trying to be women by wearing dresses).  And at this point in the semester,  even when the most unapathetic students in my classes on race and diversity or sex and love echo the refrain, "Why can't we all just get along?!" I assure them that no matter how many times they plead for equality, peace, and justice, simply begging for it does very, very little.

This is what I mean when I say that our challenge as educators of ethical and epistemic responsibility goes beyond the mere apathy of some (and this relates back to this post regarding the end of the world). One of the biggest roadblocks for change is revealed when even the most passionately and critically insightful minds and bodies feel disempowered, overwhelmed, and hopeless, like the very, very hard work they may do will all be for very,very little return, like any act of resistance is negligible because the few who care enough to fight are fighting discursive and institutional regimes that dwarf Goliath. But as I mentioned before, it is probably the nature of the beast itself, as if by design, that systems of oppression leave those who might work to resist them feeling disempowered. The challenge, then, seems to be finding ways to empower people and show them that they do make a difference, that their effort is worthwhile, that change is possible, and in fact, that it's already happening around them.

This thought for me relates to my interest in affective politics and affective relationships with philosophy. On one hand, simply undertaking the task of continual, self-reflexive critical thought is itself doing something to make changes. But it doesn't just have to start and end and stay within that one individual's changing mind because, on the other hand, these sorts of practices can serve to empower people to find ways to relate to themselves and others in new ways, and to live and be and act and speak in new ways that also affect others. All of which can be manifested at various levels, from grassroots political activism to how one talks to little kids.

The worst thing that we can do as educators is fall into our own sense of despair and hopelessness by believing that people don't or won't care. I think it is gravely mistaken, and obviously counterproductive, to underestimate the capacity for people to become invested in certain issues.  Even with my limited experiences while teaching, and thanks to the feedback from strangers on the Internet about the handful videos I've posted, I'm continually inspired and encouraged to keep doing what I do because people do care. Many people want to learn. And they want to think. And they want to develop the language and tools to be able to change the world that they live in and the experiences that they (can) have.

Our task, perhaps our responsibility, is to give them hope that this is possible.

Thursday, July 21, 2011

Being Affected by Nietzsche

[I tried to write something to introduce myself to the idea of writing an introduction for my prospectus. And this happened...]

You know those times when you meet someone new and pick up a certain kind of vibe from them? Sometimes, even if your encounter with them is brief and superficial, you might get the sense that you could really get along well together or that they are someone who you don't particularly need or want to get to know any further. In some cases, you might get a weird read from them that leaves you somewhat unsettled, or maybe there is just something about them that makes you feel better, lighter, more relaxed, or even happier. It may be that you don't even know precisely what it is about the other that resonates with you, but for whatever reason, you just have a hunch about them. Call it sheer intrigue or an insight from intuition, these experiences reflect the idea that there is something there. Even if this "I don't know quite what" can't be described, it sometimes suffices to say, "It's just a feeling."

These types of experiences have been described by the late feminist philosopher Teresa Brennan in terms of the transmission of affect. For Brennan, the felt dimension of another person's presence, how they can lift you up or bring you down, is a phenomenon that reveals something about our ontology as social subjects. More specifically, such phenomena exemplify how affects are literally transmitted among individuals and within groups. More than just sensations and "feelings," Brennan explains that affects are themselves material. Gesturing to the role of things like pheromones, Brennan notes that they are literally "in the air." Furthermore, affects can be understood in terms of the material, physiological, and biological changes that they engender in our bodies, which means that the affective dimension of our embodiment and such experiences of being energized or depleted by the presence of another are not just psychological in character, but biochemical. According to Brennan, there is also a cognitive dimension to affective experiences since affects are not mere sensations but rather occur at the moment of a (perhaps mostly unconscious) judgment. So even if you don't know what it is that makes you feel a certain way, people like Brennan want to say that an affect does, in a sense, "know" on its own. The affect indicates a judgment about whether one takes in and incorporates the affects of another or rejects and deflects them.

Brennan's analysis presents a number of important implications. Perhaps most importantly, the transmission of affect reveals that our social interactions with others affect, alter, and shape our biological bodies, for better or worse depending on if the transmitted affects are positive ones like love or negative, as in the case of anger. This is a provocative inversion of the more typical view that our social interactions are mostly guided by our biological constitution, as if one is more nurturing or aggressive because of one's biological sex (and all that this is presumed to entail in terms of hormones and "natural tendencies") rather than the affective atmospheres within which one engages with others. Already, then, the transmission of affect blurs the boundaries between what is social and what naturally biological and if one can actually be thought before the other.

A second implication arises in light of Brennan's suggestion that affects are judgments, which gestures to the epistemological importance of affects. There are various and contradictory views espoused across and within numerous disciplines regarding affective embodiment and cognition, and although there is little agreement on the precise nature of the relation between cognition and affect, the sheer volume of attention dedicated to the topic is noteworthy in that, if nothing else, it reflects the social, political, and epistemological value that is already attached to what people can "know" by virtue of their affects. This is especially evident with respect to heavily value-laden social and political issues such as discrimination and oppression or the evaluation of morally right or wrong actions. In such instances, an epistemological link is often tacitly acknowledged in appeals to things like "gut instincts" about what is right or wrong, what sort of actions are viewed as disgusting or attractive, or which groups of people evoke fear, distaste, or aversion in others.

Finally, the transmission of affect and subsequent biochemical changes in one's self that occur in light of this blur the borders between self and other. The notion of a self-contained, independent individual disintegrates. At the fundamental level of our ontology, we come to be recognized as thoroughly intersubjective beings. I (and my affects) affect you while you (and your affects) affect me. So much so that we can literally feel it when we encounter one another.

While each of these issues regarding the transmission of affect merit further analysis, I will not yet pursue them here. At this moment, I bring up Brennan's emphasis on the transmission of affect to shed light on a specific and peculiar kind of hunch that I've had in the past that is different from Brennan's analysis of the transmission of affect but that certainly shares a kind of resonance.  My hunch was about a man, but I didn't ever meet him in person. I only read his books. But it was more than that. As I read, I was deeply affected by his words. I felt charged, giddy, and much like one on a high from a new crush, this excitement would often materialize in outbursts of laughter. Sometimes his words would make me feel uncomfortable. Not just uncomfortable because I couldn't understand what he was saying, but really, physically, or better yet, physiologically uncomfortable insofar as considering the implications of his arguments would put my stomach on edge in ways that he often anticipated throughout his own writing. At other times, I would fall silent or even cry because his writing is just so poignant. So beautiful. It possesses such resonance. This man, of course, is Friedrich Nietzsche.

My first introduction to Nietzsche was in the fall of my junior year in college when I took a phenomenal class with an amazing professor entitled "Meaning and Truth in Religion."  Though I really didn't understand much about the theology we were reading, I was exposed to a different kind of philosophy, or a different way of doing philosophy; different questions, different problems, different understandings. I have since realized that this was my first exposure to what is frequently referred to as "Continental philosophy." Although I found Nietzsche's critical thoughts on metaphysics and ontology interesting then, I wasn't quite yet grabbed by him. In fact, from what I had gathered in the short time that we focused on Nietzsche in class, I was more interested in making him politically palatable--the will to power seemed to be too frequently interpreted (by myself, too, at the time) in violent and forceful ways that didn't sit well with me. I gather now that my initial desire to make him more "acceptable" reflects a good deal about my philosophical sensibilities then, but it probably also indicates that  I didn't really "get" Nietzsche yet.

We can fast forward a couple of years ahead when I found myself in graduate school in a predominantly Continental philosophy program surrounded by other philosophers and enthusiastic new graduate students. As is probably the case in most academic disciplines, whenever philosophers meet for the first time, one of the first questions people raise to break the ice asks about what kind of philosophy you are interested in and who you study.  Having declared my major rather later in my undergraduate career, I was still relatively new to philosophy, and given that I had a mostly analytic background, I wasn't even able to make sense of most of the names and topics with which others would align themselves and their projects. Heidegger and phenomenology were pretty empty signifiers for me then. But I do recall the moment when I started to align myself with two particular thinkers. It was within the first couple of weeks of my first semester in graduate school when I said to an older graduate student, "I don't know for sure what I am going to do in philosophy, but I have a hunch that I will become quite involved with two figures: Nietzsche and Foucault."

At that point, I still had a hunch, but it was only a hunch. I guess it was significant enough to act on though since, despite the fact that I still hadn't ever read a single book by Nietzsche or Foucault, but thanks to the convenience of online shopping and the impulsiveness of my spending, I actually already owned a number of them. My guess is that my theological glimpse at Nietzsche and the references to Foucault made by feminist philosophers I read during the last two years of my undergraduate studies planted some seeds in my mind, and from those seeds, my own little library had already started to sprout even before moving to graduate school. I was probably able to anticipate my trajectory just from the things that I had gathered about them through what other people had written. But even once I recognized that I had this hunch about the two who would eventually be adoringly referred to as "my philosophical homeboys," I didn't want to force things. Like with any healthy love relationship, I was willing to let it develop organically on its own. Instead of making it a point to test my feelings by immediately diving into their books, I chose to let it sit as it was for however long it needed to. I trusted that there would be a time when their relevance would make itself known, and I suspected that it would be at a time when I was ready for it.

It wasn't until the second semester of my first year in graduate school (Spring 2009) when I took a seminar on 19th Century Continental philosophy that I became fully involved in what became known to myself and others as my semester long love affair with Nietzsche. For those fifteen weeks, I truly was in love and everyone around me knew it. It even became the topic of my seminar paper. Here's the shameless introduction:
Upon my first close reading of some of Nietzsche’s work I felt myself being wrapped up in what was to be light-heartedly referred to for the rest of the semester as a love affair.  Whether I was reading in my bed at home or at a coffee shop surrounded by other people, Nietzsche made me toss my head back in laughter and throw my hands up in awe.  Literally, there were times when I read something that would make me exclaim, “Yes, Nietzsche!”  At other parts of his texts, those that proved more difficult to swallow, I noticed my discomfort rise. And there were even times in Thus Spoke Zarathustra that made me cry.  How could I explain to my friends and colleagues the experience of my semester-long fling with Nietzsche—the way his words would resonate with me, or rather, the way they would sing? This little love affair of mine might have been aptly named at the beginning, for it had quickly turned into an impassioned exploration of Nietzsche’s pages and of my own relationship to them. I am grateful that I can continue to carry around The Gay Science even after the semester is over, yet I have been left sheepishly wondering, “Could this really be love?”

While affects are certainly at play in how and when  I read Nietzsche, their presence and operation differs in important ways from the kind of transmission that Brennan discusses. Rather than being transmitted via biochemical pheromones and olfactory cues that happen when people physically encounter one another in the same time and space, my affective experiences occurred in the presence of books. Beyond mere books, however, I want to suggest that my affective experiences while reading Nietzsche indicate at least one possible way in which affects can be produced through philosophy; more specifically, through the reading of certain philosophical texts of a particular character which reach intended audiences through specialized aims.

It is because reading Nietzsche's books has so profoundly affected me on personal, physiological, and certainly philosophical levels that I will argue that the nature of philosophy itself can be understood as an embodied practice that can, at the level of our physiological constitution, affect us in ways that produce greater health, well-being, and vitality. This claim is found in the content of Nietzsche's own work (and it harkens back to more classic conceptions of philosophy among Hellenistic thinkers. This is something I will pick up at a later time). One of my aims is to show how an appreciation for Nietzsche's philosophical emphasis on health and physiology, along with the distinctive style of his writing, reveals an underestimated, and so far under-explored, connection between affect and philosophy. By no means does this mean that Nietzsche is the only philosopher to have this effect on others, but I will refer to my own affective experiences while reading his work as a kind of case-study for this connection, which involves other issues around pedagogy, rhetoric, and the "ends" of philosophy. I think it may even implicate a revision of what is characteristically understood to count as "philosophy."

This means that there are at least two distinct approaches for unpacking the relationship between affect and philosophy that I will discuss in turn. Not only are there interesting insights to be understood with respect to the philosophy of affect, that is, in terms of how we are to understand the ontological and cognitive (or not) dimensions of affect, but a greater sensitivity to the potential for affects of (or within) philosophy reveals exciting new possibilities for how we might understand, and undertake, philosophy as a transformative, even therapeutic, practice. Numerous issues surface when philosophy is undertaken as a kind of therapeutic practice that can produce such transformations, including questions about the connections between mind and body, and psyche and soma.  Metaphilosophical questions about the nature and aims of philosophy itself also become relevant. For instance, new lines can be drawn that reinterpret the classic analogy between medicine and philosophy as perhaps more than just an analogy. Furthermore, the relationships among truth, philosophy, and pedagogy can be reevaluated in terms that echo, once more, a view of philosophy as a practice, as an art of life.

Exploring the connections between affect and philosophy in both directions and raising such questions invites a dialogue of different voices and views from apparently disparate disciplines including philosophy, psychology, physiology, and neuroscience. As disparate as these fields might initially appear, on issues related to affect, emotion, and embodiment they have already been brought together in ways that reveal exciting new possibilities for health and healing. Furthermore, understanding the particular methods by which affects are cultivated, produced, evoked, or transmitted is valuable in order to better appreciate the role of affect with respect to personal well-being and political oppression or resistance. This is because, as was mentioned above, I want to suggest that not only are affects philosophically significant, but they also already operate in politically charged ways. While much of what I will explore deals with the two pronged approach to the philosophical significance of affect (that is, the philosophy of affect and affect of philosophy), this investigation is motivated by a sensitivity to the already political dimension of many affective experiences and their role in perpetuating and justifying discriminatory attitudes.

[After writing this, I went to an empty classroom with two chalkboards and sketched out a rough outline of what I think will shape up to be my dissertation.]

PART I.
PART II.


Sunday, June 19, 2011

All Things Out of Exuberance

In one of my most recent posts, while writing in the wee hours of the night into the birds' songs of the dawn, I reflected on my hesitations around writing my dissertation prospectus and concluded that I had not been fully preparing myself in ways that I knew were necessary for my own process. I spent those hours acknowledging that there was an unusual amount of fear and insecurity present in me, and I decided to allow myself a couple of more days to do whatever it was that I needed to do to get to a better, more productive place.

The next night, with philosophy books pulled off of my shelf and scattered about my bedroom floor, I ended up reading back through some of my old journals that were stored next to some of my most relevant philosophy texts. I flipped through the past two years worth of random thoughts, reminders, sketches, and poems about my relationships and the most growth-inducing experiences, as well as the tidbits of notes from philosophy talks and other paper ideas that were distributed throughout those now-filled journal pages. As I put down one journal to pick up the next, the next relationship, the next saga, the next series of challenges and reflections, their tan covers were soon intermingling with the books on my floor about feminism, phenomenology, Nietzsche, and Foucault. Of course. Of course it would all come together like that.

With the arrangement of thoughts and feelings and memories and ideas and arguments and personalities surrounding me, I picked up my current journal and began writing. Much like the texts and the books and my experiences throughout the past month of May, what I wrote reflected the near seamlessness of my philifesophy (that may be one of the first time that I have actually used the word in a sentence and meant it as such). I wrote about where I was at in that moment: After a month of dedicating my attention to my own patterns and personal relationships, I needed to create some space for myself and in my head and in my heart to let those realizations breathe a bit on their own. I need to shift gears into work, and let philosophy be the area that teaches me about my experiences. I wrote about the basic questions that will be guiding my dissertation. How is it that philosophy can change a person? How might this effect change how we understand philosophy itself? And as I elaborated upon those questions, without really intending to, I slipped back into addressing relationships (in very transcendental terms no less!): "...we work on cultivating the conditions for the possibility of the relationship..." And with that last twist in my writing, it became evident that what I needed to do was think my personal thoughts (which usually center on relationships) and my philosophical thoughts (which usually center on meta-philosophical questions) together.

No kidding, right?

I was already aware of my hesitations around philosophy. I was being held back by something, and I don't think it was just a matter of being preoccupied with all of this self-understanding that I had been engaging in for so long. It wasn't just that I needed to redirect some mental energy to the work; it was that I needed to approach my work from a different place. One that wasn't riddled with fear, anxiety, and insecurity from imposter complexes, and a place that wasn't defensive. I don't want to prove that I am right and others are wrong. I needed to get ready to do philosophy in the only way that I healthfully and happily can--by being fully engaged, creative, curious, and fully open to being transformed by it. I needed to put myself into the project with all of the passion and enthusiasm and glee that I feel whenever I read Nietzsche.

And what I soon realized was that I was also starting to do a weird thing in my personal relationships. These past few months have been really unusual: after ending my last long-term relationship in March, I've been surrounded by lots of new people and doing lots of new things. And in the process, I've met someone who I actually have started to like quite a bit. It's been rather unexpected, but wonderfully fun and exciting at the same time. Nevertheless, on that night, I realized that I was going through a pretty common thing that happens when someone starts to develop feelings for another person. It's the case with me, and I know others who have been through it too, that the precise moment when you start to like someone else is when worries begin to blossom: What if they don't like me? What if I do something stupid? What if...?

But just as quickly as those feelings were acknowledged, I let them go, because the thing is, none of that matters. Those questions and worries are misleading, if not completely misdirected already on their own. At this point in time, and it may be that this is always the case, I don't have to impress anyone. There are no stakes on making sure that someone likes me back. I can't convince someone to fall for me, and even if I could manipulate someone's heart into heavy infatuation, I wouldn't want to! To ask, "What if...?" and to approach someone (about whom you are interested in and excited about) from that place is to allow your feelings and actions to be rooted in insecurity and doubt. There is a degree of clinging that wants to bring someone into your life and hold on to them, hence the fear of rejection, but that is not a healthy source out of which one should develop any kind of relationship.

It reminded my again of why I love Nietzsche's the Gay Science: When we approach work, love, and life out of a type of need, clinging, resentment, or insecurity, this affects the nature of what follows suit. Rather than being wholly reactionary, what if we strove to take on projects, start new friendships and relationships, write philosophy, and live in general from a place of overflowing generosity? Not because of a need to hold on to something or someone or to protect ourselves, but rather because we need to express the enthusiasm, joy, creativity, passion, and love that begs to be given. How would that change our philosophy? How would it change our relationships?

After reminding myself of all of this, I went down to the kitchen and wrote myself a note:


I also used the dictionary to help me put all of this into very dry, concrete terms:

exuberance: the quality or state of being exuberant
exuberant: 1. extreme or excessive in degree, size, or extent 2. joyously unrestrained and enthusiastic, unrestrained or elaborate, especially in style: FLAMBOYANT 3: produced in extreme abundance: PLENTIFUL
exuberate: to have something in abundance: OVERFLOW

Since that night, I've been doing more work. I've had peaks of motivation and productivity, and I've felt a greater sense of relaxation and release in both my work and my interactions with those around me. All of that has, of course, still occurred in between my fair share of summer fun--karaoke, dancing, late nights of hanging out, and cooking lots of farm fresh meals. I also decided to follow up on a suggestion from a friend and read this book with my breakfasts over the past couple of days:

Go here to take a peek inside the book.


It was a good, quick, and easy read, and one that spoke to me on many levels. In fact, I wanted to write about play and how it brings me back to Nietzsche, affect, and philosophy here today, but since I got carried away with these other things, I'll save that for next time...

:)

Thursday, March 3, 2011

A few weeks of my philifesophy

The past few weeks have been marked by a unique kind of bubbling deep in my belly. It's a nervousness, or perhaps a growing awareness, and something that has resisted being put into writing. So this is my attempt. And I am taking it on in the hopes of a catharsis, or a relief, or if nothing else, part of the process of working through some thoughts and feelings.

Here is the situation:

In my professional life, I'm currently reading a list of over 40 books this semester in preparation for my comprehensive exams. Fortunately for me, my tests will be on two fascinating subjects, Feminist Philosophy and 20th Century Continental Philosophy. I've tailored my lists to materials that speak directly to issues of affect, embodiment, corporeality, materiality, sexuality, neurobiology, psychology, ethics, and philosophy.

In my personal life, I've been traversing familiar yet seemingly new ground with respect to my relationships with others and with myself. My reading lists have been incredibly illuminating of my personal process to the point where I've had to quickly summarize for my therapist parts of Nietzsche's philosophy on health and vitality, ideas about the transmission of affect, notions of corporeal generosity, and Beauvoir's incredible classic, The Second Sex. I figure, she has to hear about what I am reading in order to understand from where I am coming. But more unusually, I also took time this week to explain to my advisor (the director of my committee) what sort of things I have been addressing in therapy. She knows what I am reading, but she doesn't know the extent of my involvement with these books and how they are affecting me day after day as I pass through the pages. So, in order for her to understand how I am reading Beauvoir and Nietzsche, commentary on embodiment and values, I told her about my own personal efforts in managing healthy boundaries with people, giving more of my space and my self to my partners, and working on integrating love, trust, vulnerability, and risk in my relationships with myself and others in ways that might finally help me kick this 10 month long cough.

I've spent hours over these weeks thinking about the profound and often unsettling connections that are occurring between my personal life and my philosophy. For instance, when I asked what sort of changes might occur if we follow Spinoza's and Nietzsche's idea of creating values out of a certain affective disposition (for example, joy rather than sadness), my advisor responded by saying something like,
"It's not something that we can really specifically imagine, but I do think it would change our relationships: with institutions, with others, and even with ourselves." She likened it to an example of the creation of gods. Imagine those who were so filled with gratitude, joy, and celebration that they created gods in order to have a place toward which these feelings could be directed. And compare that to a God that is created out of fear, threat, and insecurity.

This conversation occurred just a few days after I really acknowledged something important: I have high expectations. This is not news, for I have always known that I could not allow myself to be anything but responsible, mature, successful. I expect for myself to be able to take care of myself and to be independent. There are of course reasons for why I have been been made (i.e., created, sculpted) to be this way, but more importantly, it has led to a kind of inflexibility, irritability, and demanding level of expectation within myself that gets directed to those around me, and particularly toward my partners. This, too, is not news, for I have already been learning how to "lighten up" with others. In fact, it is easier to do that with others because I do it out of compassion, kindness, and love for others. But I hadn't yet paid attention to the root of the problem, which is that I could also "lighten up" on myself. Like the example of the creation of gods, imagine, I told myself, how even my closest relationships with others might be different if I could allow myself more room to be affected by others, to be less independent, to make stupid mistakes...(Of course, it would be naive at best to think that I have not already been completely affected by others, dependent on others, and made lots of silly, stupid mistakes. I get it on a cognitive level. I'm seeing what it means to internalize it on an emotional one.)

There have been numerous other experiences like this as I've been going through my philosophy, including the shocking dis-ease that occurred as I read the Second Sex and felt as though Beauvoir was narrating my life (which I have since heard is a common response), and these experiences are coupled by intense personal memories of old relationships, friendships, and family experiences. In particular, I've been appreciating the unconditional generosity of certain friends, family members, "adopted" family members, and mentors of mine over the years. As I hope to more fully grasp the fact that we are already constituted by an openness to the Other and practice that by means of concrete moments of pure generosity, I am grateful for the examples of this that I have already encountered. I have been remembering what it felt like to receive an unquestioned, unwavering, and unconditional love from one of the most influential people in my life during my most formative years...and appreciating the commitment and dedication that was expressed in that love. In a very simple sense, I am touching on what it means to love. And at the same time, I am reading carefully about Simone de Beauvoir's notion of genuine love and Merleau-Ponty's notions of intercorporeality, expressed through Rosalyn Diprose's writing on generosity: "The body at risk is a generous body, a body that is opened to the other. And this erotic generosity is creative in transforming the other's embodied situation, and hence existence, through a self-metamorphosis that...does not reduce the other to the self. Becoming flesh is a project directed toward and beyond the other, a giving without calculation that nevertheless gets something in return through the future possibilities it opens" (Corporeal Generosity, 86). More simply: "For Merleau-Ponty, this lending to and borrowing from the bodies of others is a generosity lying not just at the core of the erotic encounter but at the heart of existence itself" (89).

In spite of the often ineffable moments that reading book after book of this stuff can generate, I've had some brief conversations about my worries of being so personally involved in my work. Is there, or should there be, a strong separation between psychology and philosophy, that is, the personal work that I do in therapy and the philosophical work I do for comprehensive exams? Is there a danger in being too personally invested in the work that if others disapprove of the content or the method, I might be setting myself up for hardship when I go on the job market? Rather than writing this on a public blog for others to see, should I be pouring myself into journal publications? Is all of this stuff on relationships and personal growth just not philosophical enough for you, whoever you are?!? I've written about my struggles with these questions before. And I've recently gotten some feedback from others. My advisor said something like this (and I have always wholly agreed with this point): "If nothing else, it's good for life to approach it philosophically. And it's good for philosophy to keep it grounded in relevant issues that involve our lives." I say, what good is philosophy if it doesn't speak directly to our experiences? This semester has already been an unanticipated challenge and growing experience precisely because the books have been speaking directly to me!

And I am not alone. In fact, my favorite philosopher has stepped up to the front of the line of my next stack of books to read. Within the Introduction of Nietzsche's Human, All Too Human, Arthur Danto writes:



"Nietzsche was always defined through divided intentions. He did not want at any time to give up his critique of the human, all too human, as he continued all the while to build the great philosophical account of human nature that in less gifted hands would have been a treatise, an essay, an enquiry, a dissertation. He tried to practice philosophy in the way he thought of history as being practiced when in the service of life rather than in the production of academic scholars. His divided intentions very nearly queered his philosophical reputation, inasmuch as philosophers since his time have pretty largely just been academic philosophers, trained by codes of expressions Neitzsche fails to follow, whereas we might now see in him a model for how to do philosophy when we want to be taken seriously in the academy and at the same time effective in life" (xix).

And I've also been quite open about the fact that I do philosophy in a particular way because I find the true philosophical significance in its application to life, growth, and flourishing, rather than for a service within institutions. This is not an original position. In talking about Nietzsche's decision to leave the academy, Marion Faber explains, "It was not only his health, however, but also his conviction that academic life was stifling and a hindrance to a true philosopher which prompted his departure. As he had already written,...a philosopher must strive not merely to be a thinker, but primarily to be a human being; this latter goal would be better realized outside the confines of a scholarly existence" (xxii). And indeed, Nietzsche did not turn away from psychology but rather towards psychology for his explanation of things like gratitude and moral valuations. Furthermore, "We can at least speculate that such a psychology of gratitude may be partially attributed to Nietzsche's own conception of his life as struggle--with himself, his illness, and the outside world" (xxx).

So as I happily turn to the small stack of Nietzsche's books again, quite aware of the risky openness and vulnerability of my own personal feelings and the likelihood that they will be affected once more (and more!) by the pages that I read, I find a sense of comfort in the possibility that I am doing something right because I am open to and aware of this relationship between my life and philosophy. In Section 6 of Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche writes, "Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown. Indeed, if one would explain how the abstrusest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really came about, it is always well (and wise) to ask first: at what morality does all this (does he) aim?"

For me, I put emphasis on becoming healthier, stronger, new, and different from what I have already been, to live a life of happiness, gaiety, creativity, and vitality. All of this, is a practice in self-overcoming.